

CHAPTER 8

PRISON PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The Terms of Reference issued by the Minister in October 2010 expressly required the Inquiry to ‘examine and make findings on the physical infrastructure of the prison, its design and construction, associated legal and/or contractual matters, and any remedial works required.’¹²³

However, in discussions with the Minister and the Department it was mutually agreed that the issue of any potential legal liability or contractual breach was a separate issue for determination between the Department and the contractual parties and which required dedicated attention.

Accordingly, in the examination of the physical infrastructure of the RPC, this Inquiry does not attempt to analyse or make judgement on any potential issue of liability or contractual breach related to the damage occasioned to individual prisoner cells during the incidents which occurred in late September – early October 2010.

Rather, the Inquiry focused on:

- ▶ The adequacy of the prison design and construction;
- ▶ Any perceived deficiencies in the current infrastructure; and
- ▶ The improvements or additions considered important for the overall efficient and effective operations of the RPC.

Planning for the new RPC had been in gestation for many years and was precipitated by a major coronial inquiry and subsequent investigation by the Ombudsman into a series of deaths in custody which occurred in 1999 and 2000.

In a report tabled in March 2001, the then Coroner Shan Tennent recommended, inter alia, that ‘the ideal may be the construction of an entirely new prison’.¹²⁴ This recommendation coincided with media commentary calling for urgent prison reform and an editorial in *The Mercury* newspaper on 28 March 2001 which described the then prevailing prison culture as one of poor training, neglect, violence and ignorance that needed to be removed before enlightened prison reform could be introduced. Shortly after this public criticism an announcement was made by the then Attorney-General Peter Patmore that a new prison would be constructed.

As a consequence of this decision a Department of Justice Prison Infrastructure Redevelopment Program (PIRP) was developed.

Under this program there were four stages. Stages A and B dealt with initial submissions for funding of the redevelopment in Tasmania’s prison’s and developing a business case regarding redevelopment options. Stage C included the construction of the new RPC, the refurbishment of the Mary Hutchinson Women’s Prison (MHWP) and extended costs to the Wilfred Lopes Centre.

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The Government approved the business case recommendations on 19 March 2001 with funding of \$53.344 million dollars being allocated for Stage C development. This funding was spread over the financial years 2001-2002 to 2006-2007. However, increased tender costs, additional medium security beds and extended Wilfred Lopes Centre construction costs, caused the Stage C project to be re-evaluated at \$90 million. Although this increased amount was appropriated, further increases in tender prices and building costs combined to prevent the construction within the Risdon Prison of the gymnasium, some 50 per cent of the educational facility, part of the industry workshop facility and a kitchen, all of which had been originally approved.

The following two diagrams depict (Diagram A) the original Stage C development plan and (Diagram B) the facilities actually constructed as a consequence of the increased Stage C building costs. These infrastructure reductions increased the difficulty of staff being able to deliver the full range of work and activity programs that had been both originally envisaged and widely discussed in the pre-construction consultation process.




DIAGRAM A – Original Stage C Development Plan

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


DIAGRAM B – Actual Stage C facilities constructed

It is also clear from Inquiry interviews, that both staff and longer serving prisoners believe that in constructing a reduced prison complex the government and department reneged on a core promise which had been seen as crucial to the creation of a new and reinvigorated prison environment.

This perception of a broken promise and the consequent inability to deliver on the full range of work and activity programs became a catalyst for increased tension between staff and senior management and between prisoners and staff.

A three part PIRP Stage D was proposed with Part 1 seen as the most urgent. Part 1 essentially provides for the construction within RPC men's maximum and medium security complex, of additional maximum security accommodation, and identified prisoner program and support facilities. As identified above, some of these works had been planned for construction during Stage C but were delayed due to final cost over runs.

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This Stage D redevelopment was divided into two phases with a total estimated capital cost of \$48.375million. Part 1 Phase A, costed at \$30.3 million, is to build an additional 62 bed maximum security accommodation unit, additional educational and recreational program facilities and a spiritual centre.

Phase B, costed at \$18.075million, provided for a third workshop building which would allow for flexible industry and activity use, and a new kitchen inside the secure perimeter for the new maximum and medium RPC, to contain a functional kitchen, offices, staff dining and lunch room areas, and a variety of storage and wash down areas. Part 1 Phase B also provided for the construction of a geriatric unit to provide for the increasingly higher proportion of ageing and infirm prisoners requiring higher levels of care.

When however, the Stage D project costs were further considered in 2008, an amount of only \$20.7million was approved for the Part 1 redevelopment. This funding was to be appropriated over a five year timeframe in accordance with the following schedule:

Financial Years (2010- 2015)

- 2010-2011 – \$100,000
- 2011-2012 – \$500,000
- 2012-2013 – \$3million
- 2013-2014 – \$13.4million
- 2014-2015 – \$3.7million

As a consequence of the above schedule, no meaningful work has yet begun and, according to recent advice from a quantity surveyor, inflation costs since the initial \$20.7million approval was given in 2008, mean that it will cost some \$23million to undertake the same amount of work at today's value.

While it is understood the precise work schedule has not yet been agreed, essentially, under the current timeframe, full design work and early earth works will not commence until 2012-2013 with major construction unlikely to commence until 2013-2014.

In considering the proposed construction timeframe it is important to recognise that construction will occur inside a highly secure environment with potentially three separate construction sites contained within a maximum security prison complex. If these three construction projects are not carried out simultaneously, the cost increases are likely to be quite substantial.

The Inquiry believes that the facilities identified for construction under Stage D Part 1 are important if not vital to creating and maintaining a dynamic, healthy prison environment.

The funding environment within which any further Stage D redevelopment decisions are likely to be made is understood, but it is necessary for the Inquiry to emphasise that unless early additions are made to the current building infrastructure, the current situation will only deteriorate further, with the possibility of a complete prison breakdown.

By way of balance however, it is important to recognise that while there are deficiencies in the current infrastructure of the new RPC, any design and construction improvements will need to be both preceded and accompanied by fundamental cultural and operational practice change if the desired prison practice improvements are to be achieved.

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A short review of the circumstances surrounding the breach of his cell by a prisoner (Prisoner A) on 27 September 2010 serves to illustrate this point. On the evidence available to the Inquiry it is clear the cell breach was a direct response to the fact that the prisoner had been locked down in his cell for a period of five days. This had occurred as a consequence of a group lockdown, which directly resulted from the assaults on prison staff on 22 September, and which had continued despite the fact that the prisoner concerned had not been involved in the assaults.

After escaping from his cell, Prisoner A was still contained within the maximum security open area by two perimeter fences, one of which is electrified. He did not attempt to breach either of these fences and there is no evidence that he either intended or attempted to escape from the complex itself.

He was discovered on the roof of the Derwent B unit from where he demanded an independent psychological assessment, water and tobacco.

The cell breach was essentially a personal protest by the prisoner to the prevailing situation and was replicated by another prisoner (Prisoner B) on or about 1 October 2010. Three other similar attempted cell breaches were then discovered during a subsequent maximum security area inspection.

As emphasised in the Woolf Report¹²⁵, the maintenance of a correct balance between security, control and justice is fundamental to an effectively managed prison. The importance of achieving and maintaining this balance is recognised broadly by prison managers as being the key to a stable and constructive prison environment. This balance needs to be understood and reflected in the design and physical infrastructure of any prison complex.

As indicated in other areas of this report, within the TPS Risdon Prison environment there is evidence of ineffective leadership and management, poor planning, inconsistent operational practices, inadequate workplace health and safety, risk assessment and mitigation processes, and inconsistent and often inappropriate prisoner management and treatment.

In the opinion of the Inquiry, the combination of these deficiencies currently renders the new RPC largely dysfunctional. Unless there is a genuine commitment to remedying these deficiencies and creating a genuinely healthy prison environment, additions to the physical infrastructure of RPC will be of little value and prisoner unrest and disorder will continue to occur.

Indeed it is understood that an increased number of prisoner on prisoner assaults have occurred and that the overall prison situation has further and significantly deteriorated since the stand down incident of 21 February 2011 (a period during which this report was being written).

Finding 67

While some of the identified operational deficiencies have been aggravated by limitations in the physical structure of the new RPC many of them can and must be improved regardless of the decisions made in regard to the Prison Infrastructure Redevelopment Plan (PIRP).

The above statement and Finding should not, however, be interpreted as suggesting that the current Stage D – PIRP should not proceed and is not an urgent requirement – it is. Rather, it is to emphasise that cultural and operational practice reform is also urgent and will be fundamental to the improvements expected to be achieved through the Stage D Part 1 redevelopment project.

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Finding 68

The infrastructure identified for construction under Stage D Part 1 is important if not vital to creating and maintaining a dynamic, healthy prison environment which reflects contemporary prison practice.

Finding 69

Unless meaningful improvements are concurrently made to both the RPC infrastructure and to existing management and operational practices, the current situation of industrial disputation and prisoner unrest will continue to deteriorate.

The Inquiry would urge the Government to increase funding towards the \$48.375million initially costed for the completion of Stage D Part 1 of the PIRP although it is recognised that it may be necessary to phase in the additional infrastructure development over a period of years.

This process may be assisted by an indication of a stabilisation, even a slight reduction, in prisoner numbers. Whereas prisoner numbers for 2011-2012 were projected to be in the order of 550-580 when the PIRP process commenced, actual numbers appear to have stabilised at about 450-460.

Clearly the Drug Diversion Program, which is likely to have between 80-100 people within the program at any one time, has contributed to the reduced prison population numbers, but the benefits to RPC are nevertheless real.

While the future effectiveness of such programs cannot be guaranteed, current performance would provide confidence for the view that the initial estimate of 62 additional beds required within the maximum security unit may exceed what will now be necessary. As a consequence, it is suggested that in the Stage D Part 1 redevelopment process approval only be considered for the construction of a 25-30 bed maximum security unit.

Recommendation 38

That the Government reconsider its current 2008 approval of \$20.7million for the Stage D Part 1 development of the Risdon Prison Complex and approve the expenditure of the original estimated capital cost of the total Stage D Part 1 development of \$48.375million.

If it is necessary to stage future funding approvals for PIRP development it is proposed that the development be staged in the following order:

- ▶ construction of the additional educational and multipurpose workshop facilities and an adequate prisoner gymnasium and additional exercise yards for maximum security prisoners, be given first priority;
- ▶ construction of a new (25-30 bed) high risk and behavioural management security unit consistent with that recommended in the Ombudsman Report of June 2010 be given second priority; and
- ▶ construction of a kitchen, spiritual centre and a geriatric unit be considered as a third priority.

In providing this phased approach as an option, the Inquiry notes that the original program for building Stage D Part 1 Phase A was due for completion by September 2010.

Recommendation 39

Should the government find it necessary to stage the additional RPC infrastructure development that, as a minimum allocation, the \$20.7million approved in 2008, be appropriated immediately, with construction occurring in accordance with the following priorities in order to maximise the effectiveness of necessary cultural and operational practice reform:

- ▶ Priority 1: additional educational and multipurpose workshop facilities and an adequate prisoner gymnasium (including extended maximum security exercise yards);
- ▶ Priority 2: new high risk and behavioural management security unit consistent with Recommendation 1 of the Ombudsman's Investigation Report of June 2010; and
- ▶ Priority 3: construction of a kitchen, spiritual centre and a geriatric unit.

Finding 70

If genuine and meaningful achievements are to be made within RPC it will be important to minimise any delay in building all of the above Stage D Part 1 facilities.

Having regard to the particular issues confronting the Tasmania Prison Service at RPC it may be prudent to consider a more humanising approach to any further development of RPC.

The overall appearance of the prison is dominated by security fences, caged walkways and hard concrete buildings. While this is historically not unusual for high-security prisons, the trend in Scandinavian countries and elsewhere, is toward a more human scale and domestic style accommodation within a secure perimeter, rather than large, impersonal cell blocks. This is in line with research which suggests that the environment is an important contributor to determining behaviour – that a social environment tends to generate feelings of inclusion and results in more socially acceptable behaviour than an institutional environment which tends to elicit more anti-social behaviour. Having said that, it is quite possible to develop good relations even in harsh and uncompromising environments. The regime in the RBMSP being a case point. However, there is likely to be some benefits to be had from examining ways to lessen the hard institutional facade of the prison with some humanising elements. Consistent with this approach, it may also be valuable to consider renaming the maximum and medium security units 'secure' and 'residential'. The name changes would serve to reinforce the desired emphasis on developing and maintaining a dynamic and interactive staff-prisoner environment and the appropriate interventions, prisoner pathways and management strategies.

As part of the consideration and assessment of the RPC infrastructure, visits were made to the Maryborough Correctional Centre and Woodford Correctional Centre in Queensland, the HM Barwon Prison and Metropolitan Remand Centre in Victoria, and the Goulburn Correctional Centre, including the high risk unit, in New South Wales.

The Maryborough Correction Centre design was the basis for the new Risdon medium and maximum security prison. Within Queensland however there are 13 Corrections Centres in different geographic locations across the State. This affords the Queensland correction authorities with a significant range of options and operational flexibility in the managing of prisons.

Tasmania does not enjoy the same operational flexibility, with the RPC providing essentially the only major maximum and medium security facility in the State. This inflexibility, coupled with the reduced current RPC infrastructure, has clearly contributed to the issues that gave rise to this Inquiry.

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It is, however, clear from the visits and observations made at each of the interstate facilities that the operating ethos in the interstate facilities visited, is fundamentally different to that which currently exists at RPC.

Without question, the limited work activity, education and recreational facilities available within the new Risdon Prison significantly restrict staff (particularly considering issues of prisoner segregation and classification) in providing appropriate out-of-cell time and structured day activities. The comparative assessment of interstate corrections centres, however, demonstrates that there is potential for significantly improved staff/prisoner interaction and prisoner activity within the existing Risdon Prison infrastructure.

This potential may perhaps best be illustrated by a short examination of the environment observed within correction centres in each of the three jurisdictions visited, the Maryborough Correctional Centre in Queensland, the HM Barwon Prison in Victoria, and the Goulburn Correctional Complex in New South Wales.

Within the Queensland prison environment the strong overarching statement made by prison executives was that 'in a good gaol the last things to be considered are the physical buildings' and that 'gaols are about relationships'.¹²⁶ The perimeter fences of the facilities were simply seen as the boundaries of the village within which these relationships were developed and the prison infrastructure as the buildings within which business was done.

During both executive briefings and site inspections, all of the advice and communication emphasised that developing and maintaining a dynamic and interactive staff-prisoner environment was the priority challenge and that while the prison infrastructure needed to provide capacity and security it was essentially secondary. The dynamic and interactive staff/prisoner environment was seen as allowing maximum value and use to be gained from the prison infrastructure. At the Maryborough Correctional Centre, while the physical design largely reflected the new Risdon Prison, the operational environment was significantly different.

Queensland operates under a two-tiered classification system, comprising maximum and minimum prisoners. The prison population at Maryborough when visited was 466 prisoners with 80 per cent classified as maximum security prisoners. There are 180 beds in the high classification mainstream units, and a total of 220 residential beds. In addition there are 2 management units which provide prisoners with opportunities for improvement and 4 high protection units within which there is no ability for direct access to residential programs.

Residential units obviously offered more opportunities and freedom to prisoners with access to and from their cells during the night although each unit was still locked down each night. Prisoners enjoy longer times out of cells, have their own cooking facilities and greater access to recreational activities.

Residential is opened with a morning headcount and unlock at 07:30am with a count and lockdown occurring at 06:30pm. While mainstream maximum prisoners enjoyed less freedom and flexibility there is rostered activity within the structured day program education block during which selected mainstream prisoners mingle with minimum or residential prisoners during educational classes. Protected prisoners remain segregated.

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The mainstream maximum unit is normally unlocked at 07:30am and not subject to lockdown until 06:30pm (a maximum of 11 hours out-of-cell time) although hourly patrols are conducted through the unit. During the out of cell time mainstream prisoners could return to their own cells but, if so, were locked in until the next hourly patrol conducted by the prison officers. The structured day timetable included workshops, education, medication, health and other activities such as sports. Prison staff conducted daily briefings and debriefings as part of the structured day.

The prison grounds and officer stations and prisoner common rooms and cells were clean and well maintained and prisoners acted and spoke respectfully to staff and members of the Inquiry team.

At the time of the Inquiry visit, groups of maximum security prisoners were mixing freely in grassed and open space areas and staff and prisoners were interacting in a positive and constructive way. Senior management was clearly visible and obviously had a positive and personal relationship with staff and were seen as approachable by prisoners.

A weekly management walk-around is conducted by the entire management team including the General Manager and the Accommodation, Industry and Administrative Managers. During this time, prisoners are able to discuss issues with any of the managers with the expectation that issues will be noted and followed up and the prisoner advised.

Most prisoners have a clearly defined and understood structured day which is broken into two shifts, one 4 hour shift on work related activity, and one 4 hour shift on education. Peer programs operate with longer term prisoners assisting newer arrivals.

Prisoners each had their own personal plan and were aware of their potential pathway through the system. The pathway plan was clearly incentive driven and the prisoners appeared to engage with both the development and the operation of the program.

A case management system is a strong feature of the Maryborough operations and appears to be well understood by both staff and prisoners. Case notes are audited daily and prison officers are required to include both good and bad behaviour comments and any issues, no matter how small, including interactions with prisoners in their case notes.

Internal audit checks are conducted of prison officers to ensure they are doing the jobs expected of them and this is supplemented by a State-wide compliance system which involves compliance managers being placed in most Queensland prisons and undertaking audits and compliance checks, including remedial action not dissimilar to occupational audit and compliance processes.

All of these operational practice arrangements were seen by Queensland corrections executives as crucial to the overall security of the prison as well as the maintenance of a healthy prison.

The HM Barwon Prison in Victoria is a maximum security facility which contains some 1000 beds and which houses some of the most dangerous prisoners in the State.

The prison is some 19 years old, and from reports, previously had a reputation as a hard, dark place.¹²⁷ However, despite its age and prisoner profile, the prison demonstrated a similarly constructive and interactive staff-prisoner environment to that which had been observed at the Maryborough Correctional Centre.

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The Inquiry team was escorted through the prison by the General Manager who was clearly well known and respected by staff and known to prisoners. It became obvious from conversations with staff that the General Manager had a visible presence within the prison complex on a daily basis and that the entire senior management team also had a high profile within the prison.

Operational meetings were conducted on a daily basis and chaired or attended by the General Manager. These meetings discussed with all staff what had happened during the past 24 hours, what was scheduled for the forthcoming day, and provided opportunity for any staff to raise concerns they may have.

The Inquiry was advised that formal monthly occupational health and safety meetings are conducted together with two weekly compliance meetings which focus on basic business and what is essential to good security.

Each month, plenary style 'Town Hall' meetings are conducted by delaying the unlocks and operating the prison with a skeleton staff during the period of the meeting. These meetings are chaired by the General Manager, and attended by all remaining on-duty staff. Official Visitors are invited together with occasional speakers, and a topical agenda is set for each meeting. Each Unit Manager is required to provide a situational report, identify and share any initiatives implemented or being considered and to provide feedback on the progress of relevant programs.

An issue of particular relevance to the current situation at RPC was the role of the Victorian Corrections Security and Emergency Services Group (SESG). The SESG has a state-wide operational role and is on call for any emergency response. Local Emergency Response Groups (ERG) operate at each prison and may rotate into the SESG. While not having a permanent presence within the prison, ERG members are required to conduct a minimum number of high security searches each month and are paid an allowance to be on emergency response group footing. This requires after-hours training for which they are also paid.

At the Metropolitan Remand Centre the operational centres in the units were open reception-style areas separated only from the prisoners common room area by a low counter rather than officers being enclosed in 'gold fish bowl' style centres as exist at RPC. Despite the fact that most prisoners were maximum security rated, staff interacted consistently with the prisoners from within these operational centres.

The Inquiry team also visited the New South Wales Goulburn Maximum Security Correctional Centre (GCC) and the Goulburn High Risk Management Correctional Centre (HRMCC) which are jointly located within the Goulburn Correctional Complex.

The GCC is a combination of late 19th and early 20th century and some recently constructed buildings. Essentially though it is a 100 year old prison facility which is recognised as housing some of the most dangerous and difficult prisoners in New South Wales.

The HRMCC is a smaller 75 bed modern facility with state of the art security infrastructure and provides a level of security above that ordinarily provided in mainstream maximum security centres.

Both facilities, one due to its age and the other by its specific design, could be described as having hard traditional infrastructure with a predominant security focus.

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Within the mainstream GCC many of the older style buildings do not easily lend themselves to a dynamic security environment. Additionally the level and nature of violence within GCC in recent years has caused management to introduce a separation policy based on racial grounds with prisoners segregated and accommodated in yards or wings of between 20-40 prisoners.

Despite these issues and the restrictions they unavoidably must impose on the delivery of programs, a range of programs and educational opportunities are still available to prisoners, with the prevailing management philosophy being that “occupying prisoners is critical to the maintenance of a safe and cost efficient prison”.¹²⁸

Mainstream GCC prisoners enjoy on average 5½ hours out of cell time (9am - 2:30pm) per day and prisoners other than those rated as ‘extreme high risk’ have access to education block and work opportunities.

Mainstream GCC has an industry workshop with some 100 places and includes a cabinet making/ carpentry facility, a tailor shop and a laundry.

A specific indigenous industry workshop offers indigenous prisoners culturally based traditional art and artefact work and skills development programs. These programs are widely recognised as having contributed to the stabilisation of the indigenous prisoner population and to a marked reduction in levels of indigenous prison violence.

Prisoners categorised as ‘extremely high risk’ have no access to education block, are restricted to their respective yards and are subject to cell moves once each 28 days.

Due to the volatile and dangerous profile of many mainstream prisoners, musters are particularly tightly controlled. As part of these controls, four members of the New South Wales Immediate Action Team (IAT), (which essentially is the equivalent of the TPS TRG), are routinely in attendance at all musters. While dressed in essentially the same uniform as general custodial officers they attend musters armed with batons and gas and have a ready response responsibility.

Importantly however, despite the obvious prisoner profile and the ready response priorities of IAT members, they have a strong ‘de-escalation focus’ and are specifically trained in conflict resolution and negotiation skilling. IAT team members who are identified as unnecessarily assertive or over aggressive are immediately transferred back to the general work force.

Members of the IAT are volunteers who are drawn from the general custodial workforce, receive no additional salary or allowances, and are subject to rotation back into the general workforce after 1-2 years of IAT service.

The HRMCC is a purpose built maximum security facility designed to accommodate up to 75 male prisoners assessed as posing an extreme high risk to the safety of the community, to staff and to other prisoners. It is suggested by the Inquiry that it is unlikely that any current RPC prisoner would be assessed as warranting HRMCC custody or to be classified as an extreme high risk in the GCC environment.

Regardless of the extreme high risk assessment of HRMCC prisoners, they enjoy on average six hours out of cell time daily (8:30am-2:30pm), have access to their own kitchen in their day rooms (which are shared with a maximum of one other approved prisoner), have access to psychology and counselling support services, education on request and to a grassed sports area which includes a small circular running track and a basketball court.

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The day to day management of HRMCC prisoners follows standard operational procedures. A case management team assesses and decides the behavioural management level of each individual prisoner by reference to clearly articulated written progression and regression criteria.

Unlike the situation in medium and maximum at Risdon Prison, the case management systems at all interstate correctional facilities which the Inquiry visited, strongly emphasised and encouraged the active participation of prisoners in the identification of short and long term goals and specific behaviour targets. This is not to suggest there is not a strong disciplinary basis to the practice of case management but rather to emphasise the importance of the behaviour monitoring role and a behaviour driven, rather than time driven, assessment and reclassification process.

Ongoing staff development and refresher training together with effective supervision is seen as critical to maintaining the desired levels and consistency of operational practice.

The following extract from the HRMCC management plan generally reflects the expectations identified at each of the interstate facilities visited and reinforces the concerns of the Inquiry as to the current level of knowledge and understanding of Risdon Prison Staff.

“It is... critical that all staff are thoroughly trained in all key functional areas including: Security and operational procedures, anti corruption strategies, assessment and reassessment, focused case management and related program. It is particularly important that training be provided to ensure staff understand and consistently provide accurate documentation as and when required.”¹²⁹

As identified in Chapter 6 of this report, a similar level of knowledge and understanding or commitment to targeted refresher training is not evident within Risdon Prison.

The importance and value of the dynamic security practices evidenced in the interstate secure correctional facilities which were visited by the Inquiry team is reinforced by the pie chart at page 106 which clearly identifies the issues that RPC prisoners who were interviewed identified as of most importance and concern.

CHAPTER 9

ACRONYMS

BCP	Business Continuity Plan
BMP	Behavioural Management Program
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
DSOs	Director's Standing Orders
EMC	Emergency Management Centre
ERG	Emergency Response Group
GCC	Goulburn Maximum Security Correctional Centre
HHMD	Hand Held Metal Detector
HRMCC	High Risk Management Correctional Centre
IAT	Immediate Access Team
IMS	Integrated Management System
IOM	Integrated Offender Management
LSCMI	Level of Service Case Management Inventory
MHWD	Mary Hutchinson Women's Prison
NGO	Non Government Organisation
OPCAT	Optional Protocol for the Convention Against Torture
PIRP	Prison Infrastructure Redevelopment Program
RBMSPP	Ron Barwick Minimum Security Prison
RPC	Risdon Prison Complex
SESG	Security and Emergency Services Group
SMT	Senior Management Team
SMS	Security Management System
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
TIC	Tasmanian Industrial Commission
TRG	Tactical Response Group
WH&S	Workplace Health and Safety
WTMD	Walk Through Metal Detector